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I. INTRODUCTION
You walk into the doctor's office complaining of stomach pains that
will not go away, an issue that arises after you eat certain foods. At the same
time across town, someone else is experiencing the same pain and conveying
the same symptoms to his doctor. Both doctors prescribe metoclopramide
tablets, a prescription drug used to treat digestive tract problems. When you
order your prescription, the pharmacist fills your prescription with the generic
form of the drug. Across town, another pharmacist fills the prescription with
the brand-name drug Reglan. After an extended amount of time using the
prescription, you develop a serious movement disorder known as tardive
dyskinesia. Often irreversible, this disorder has symptoms which include
involuntary, repetitive tic-like movements, primarily in the facial muscles or
(less commonly) the limbs, fingers, and toes.' You bring a suit against the drug
manufacturers under your state's regulatory laws; however, you are unable to
recover because the generic prescription drug manufacturer is not subject to the
more stringent regulations of your state. Your counterpart, the patient across
town, also files a claim, but recovers damages from the brand-name
manufacturer that is subject to the state regulatory scheme. You cannot recover,
despite a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States noting that if your
pharmacist had filled your prescription with the brand-name drug, instead of
the generic drug, you would have had a claim.2 Further, this claim would have
been strong, except for the decision by the Court that your state's law has been
preempted by federal law. 3 Because of the dual system of government that has
formed in the United States, state versus federal, the Court has held that some
state regulation is preempted b' federal regulation (i.e. both state and federal
cannot regulate the same area). The Supreme Court succinctly stated the issue
at hand, which mirrored the story above:
Had Mensing and Demahy taken Reglan, the brand-name drug
prescribed by their doctors, [the holding in] Wyeth would
control and their lawsuits would not be pre-empted. But
because pharmacists, acting in full accord with state law,
substituted generic metoclopramide instead, federal law pre-

Introduction
&
Overview,
Tardive
Dyskinesia
http://www.tardivedyskinesia.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2012).
2
PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581-82 (2011).

TARDIVE

DYsKINESIA,

Richard C. Ausness, The Impact of Wyeth v. Levine on FDA Regulation of Prescription
Drugs, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 248 (2010).
4
Id
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empts these lawsuits. We acknowledge the unfortunate hand
that federal drug regulation has dealt ....
In a controversial decision preceding the above statement in PLIVA v.
Mensing,6 the United States Supreme Court held in Wyeth v. Levine7 that
federal preemption did not apply to a state tort law failure-to-warn claim for a
brand-name prescription drug.8 Two years later in PLIVA, a split five to four
decision, the Court held that the same state standards were preempted as they
applied to the manufacturers of generic prescription drugs. 9
Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy were prescribed Reglan, the brandname form of metoclopramide tablets (used to treat digestive tract problems) in
2001 and 2002.1o Before Mensing and Demahy were prescribed Reglan,
however, evidence had accumulated that long-term metoclopramide use could
cause tardive dyskinesia," a "serious movement disorder that is often
irreversible[.]"l 2 These findings (sometimes referred to as "events" by the Food
and Drug Administration) strengthened warning labels for the drug several
times over a period of twenty plus years. 3 The final and strongest warning
label was issued in 2009, which stated: "[t]reatment with metoclopramide can
cause tardive dyskinesia, a serious movement disorder that is often
irreversible .... Treatment with metoclopramide for longer than 12 weeks
should be avoided in all but rare cases."' 4 Both Mensing and Demahy took the
drug, in its generic form, for several years and developed tardive dyskinesia.,5
Mensing's and Demahy's prescriptions were filled with the generic form of
Reglan because many states had "enacted legislation authorizing pharmacists to
substitute generic drugs when filling prescriptions for brand-name drugs" 1 6 in

5
6

PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (internal citations omitted).
Id.

9

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
Id. at 555.
PL1VA, 131 S. Ct. at 2569.

0

Id at 2572-73.

8

1 Id. at 2572 (citing McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d 364, 370 n.5 (5th Cir. 2006)); Douglas
Shaffer et al., Tardive Dyskinesia Risks and Metoclopramide Use Before and After U.S. Market
Withdrawal of Cisapride, 44 J. AM. PHARMACISTS Ass'N 661, 663 (2004) (noting eighty-seven
cases of metoclopramide-related tardive dyskinesia reported to the FDA's adverse event
reporting system by mid-2003).
12

Id.

13

14

PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572.
Id. (citing PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2902 (65th ed. 2011)).

1s

Id.

6

Id. at 2583 (citation omitted). The dissent in PLIVA noted the following:
Currently, all States have some form of generic substitution law. Some States
require generic substitution in certain circumstances. Others permit, but do not
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the years leading up to the Hatch-Waxman Amendments." Both legislative
movements, the substitution legislation in states and the federal action through
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, were meant to "expand consumption of lowcost generic drugs."' 8
Both Mensing and Demahy brought suits in their respective states,
Minnesota and Louisiana, claiming that the manufacturers of the generic form
of Reglan were liable under state tort law for failing to provide adequate
warning labels.' 9 The generic manufacturers ("Manufacturers"), on the other
hand, claimed that federal law, under the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA"), preempted the state tort claims. 20 The Court agreed with the
Manufacturers, reversing both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' holdings that the
claims were not preempted. 2 1 The Court decisively distinguished the case from
Wyeth, finding that "federal drug regulations, as interpreted by the FDA,
prevented the Manufacturers from independently changing their generic drugs'
safety labels,",2 2 in stark contrast to brand-name prescription drug
manufacturers.2 3
Cases addressing federal preemption of state tort lawsuits have been
extraordinarily predominate in the Court over the past few decades.24 Including
PLIVA, at least seventeen cases involving the issue have been addressed by the
Court since 1992, seven of which were handed down by the Roberts Court.2 5

require, substitution. Some States require patient consent to substitution, and all
States "allow the physician to specify that the brand name must be prescribed,
although with different levels of effort from the physician."
Id. (citation omitted).
"
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984). The 1984 amendments are commonly referred to by the last names of their
original Congressional co-sponsors, Senate Judiciary Committee Senator Orrin Hatch and House
Energy & Commerce Committee Representative Henry Waxman. These amendments were
meant to make production of generic drugs cheaper (because of less regulation) so that a lower
cost would trickle down to consumers. Erika King Lietzan, A Brief History of 180-Day
Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food,Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287, 315 (2004).
18
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2583.
9
Id at 2572.
20

Id.

Id. at 2569, 2573.
Id at 2570.
23
Id at 2581-82.
24
Mary J. Davis, The "New" PresumptionAgainst Preemption,61 HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1217
(2010); Christina E. Wells, William E. Marcantel & D. Winters, Preemption of Tort Lawsuits:
The Regulatory Paradigm in the Roberts Court, 40 STETSON L. REv. 793, 793-94 (2011)
[hereinafter Wells].
25
Wells, supra note 24, at 793 (noting the Roberts Court's "keen interest in preemption
battles").
21

22
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The plethora of cases on the matter, however, does not make the outcome of
preemption cases any easier to forecast. The question of what analysis of
preemption the Court will use, usually based on who the members of the
majority are, is still a perplexing part of gauging how the Court will decide.2 6
For example, United States Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, the
majority's author in PLIVA, has made clear in previous cases his disdain for the
"purposes and objectives" of preemption jurisprudence,27 which is arguably an
escape route for courts that want to find that a state law has not been
preempted. 28 As Justice Thomas's stance shows, whether or not a person will
actually have a remedy for a tortious injury in certain preemption cases will
depend on the make-up of the Court at the time his or her case rises to that
level.
The Court's problematic analysis leads to several questions about how
the composition of the Roberts Court affects the outcome of federal preemption
cases. Are the members of the Court actually advocating positions in
preemption cases that they usually, or previously, had not advocated? Is there a
reason that United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, usually
willing to write why he is or is not concurring, was not compelled to discuss his
reasons for not joining the majority in its reasoning of the case based on the
arguments surrounding the supposed non obstante provision of the Supremacy
Clause? 29 Was the Court's decision consistent with that held in Wyeth v.
Levine? Is it correct, under the current law, to afford generic drug
manufacturers more protection from state tort law liability than their brandname counterparts?
These questions will be answered in this Note. In Part II, this Note
discusses the federal preemption backdrop against which PLIVA was decided
in, and the generic drug regulation that led to its result. Part III, "The PLIVA
Decision," provides: (1) a brief background of the case; (2) a review of the
trends in the Court over the years that have led to inconsistency in federal
preemption law and in this case; (3) a summarization of Wyeth and how it is
affected by the PLIVA decision; (4) a discussion of the missing concurrence of
Justice Kennedy and how it may show a willingness for Kennedy to shift in the
future if a practitioner molds their argument in his favor or if the same four
Justices insist on using the non obstante provision argument; and (5) an
analysis of United States Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor's dissent
which delves into the other side of the PLIVA argument, and because of the

26
Erwin Dhemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1313 (2004); Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against
Preemption: An Empirical Study of CongressionalResponses to Supreme Court Preemption
Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1604 (2007).
27
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 600-04 (2009).
28
See id.
29
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2571, 2579-80.
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volatility of the Court at this time, may in the future be the law on this issue. In
Part IV, this Note discusses: (1) the unbalanced outcome that has arisen from
the current treatment of generic drug versus brand-name drugs and the different
alternatives that could be applied in this area of law, and (2) the current
application of the law in lower courts and how the Court's precedent may have
left some loopholes for trial courts to maneuver around the holdings of PLIVA
and Wyeth. Based on the above, it is clear that the Court has wavered in its
federal preemption precedent, leading to the dichotomy that we see in PLIVA
and Wyeth today. Because of this unsatisfactory dichotomy which favors one
type of plaintiff over another, PLIVA was decided incorrectly. Because of this
incorrect decision, a solution is required that would allow consumers of generic
drugs to have some vindication; this solution can be found in allowing the
Attorney General in each respective state to bring a suit when found necessary
by public outcry.
II. BACKGROUND
Part II.A of this Note provides a general overview of federal
preemption.30 Part II.B describes the state of generic drug regulation as it is
now, and how it compares to brand-name drug regulation, with an emphasis on
federal regulation.
A.

FederalPreemption Overview

Federal preemption law today is ripe with controversy and has
developed a dichotomy of express and implied preemption that must be
distinguished in order to fully understand this area of law. The controversy that
has arisen can begin to be understood by reviewing the patterns of recent
Supreme Court panels, from the Burger Court to the present Court, and how
each court has applied federal preemption standards. The following is a
foundation for comprehending why the PLIVA case was decided incorrectly.
1.

An Introduction to the Preemption Dichotomy

Federal preemption is rooted in the tension between state sovereignty
and federal supremacy. The United States has chosen a system of dual
sovereignty3 under which "[t]he principle of federal preemption enables
federal law to prevail over conflicting state statutes, local ordinances[,] and

This overview is not meant to be, and is not, exhaustive of the subject area, but only
provides what is needed for this Note.
31
Roger Pilon, Into the Preemption Thicket Again-Five Times!, 2011 CATO SuP. CT. REV.
263, 264 (2011).
30
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even state common-law doctrines."32 The basis of federal preemption is found
in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which establishes
that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land . .. any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 3 3 The
Supreme Court, however, has applied the "presumption against preemption" in
cases where "such traditional areas of state concern as public health and safety"
are in question "unless Congress makes its intent to preempt 'clear and

manifest."'

34

Preemption cases are classified under a dichotomy of express and
Express preemption occurs where Congress has
implied preemption.
explicitly provided that federal law controls and excludes state regulation in a
certain area. Additionally, a federal agency can make an "express statement
that it intends (by federal regulation) to displace state law." 3 This
administrative preemption allows federal agencies, when acting under the
power given to them by Congress and through federal statute, to supersede state

law. 38
Most cases, however, fall under the implied preemption branch.
Implied preemption occurs when an express intention by either Congress or an
administrative agency is not present, and the Court must infer Congress's (or
the agency's) preemptive intent.39 Implied preemption is further broken down
into two types: occupation of the field and conflict preemption.4 0 Occupation of
the field occurs when Congress has regulated in a certain field so pervasively as
to disallow any other regulation, or where the regulated subject is of
"'peculiarly federal' interest."A Conflict preemption, the second type of
implied preemption, is further broken down into two types: obstacle
preemption and impossibility preemption.42 Obstacle preemption permits state
law to be displaced where it "stands as an obstacle to the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."4 3 Impossibility preemption, which was the basis of

32

Ausness, supra note 3, at 248.

33

U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
Ausness, supra note 3, at 248.

34

3
KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION: A REPORT OF THE APPELLATE JUDGES
CONFERENCE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 15-18 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1991).
36
Id. at 14-15; Ausness, supra note 3, at 248.
37

STARR ET AL., supra note 35, at 31.

3s

Id

Id at 14.
Id. at 18-30; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More Muddle,
or Creepingto Clarity?, 45 TULSA L. REv. 197, 199 (2009).
3

40

41

STARR ET AL., supra note 35, at 19.

42

Bhagwhat, supra note 40, at 200.

43

STARR ET AL., supra note 35, at 27.
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PLIVA, occurs where it is "impossible for a private party to comply with both
state and federal requirements.""
A final niche in the federal preemption regime is the non obstante
provision argument used by certain members of the Supreme Court.45 The
Supreme Court has held that the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution is a non obstante provision because it states that "any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."4 6 The
Court uses this clause to reason that federal law impliedly repeals conflicting
state law and that "courts should not strain to find ways to reconcile federal law
with seemingly conflicting state law."A7 Thus, the Court uses the non obstante
provision argument to make the preemption defense48 an easier hurdle for
private defendants, such as large generic drug manufacturers, who under this
doctrine, no longer need "to attempt to comply with state law before being
heard to complain that compliance with both laws was impossible."49 The
defendants, and the majority, used this same argument in PLIVA.so
2.

Application by the Supreme Court

The panels of the Supreme Court spanning from the Burger Court to
the now-residing Roberts Court have been inconsistent in applying the federal
preemption doctrine. Although each court was generally working with the same
legal standards, each court found its own way to manipulate the outcome of
preemption cases.
The Burger Court, 1969 to 1986, generally upheld state action over
federal regulatory power in its application of federal preemption doctrine.5'
Where it was not clear that Congress clearly and expressly preempted state law,
the Burger Court was (generally) more willing to allow state law to prevail.52

4
PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 (2011) (citing Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280,287 (1995)).

4

Id. at 2579.
Id. (citing U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2).

47

Id. at 2580.

45

The author frequently uses the term "preemption defense." This refers to a defendant's use
of the argument that the state tort law in question is preempted by federal law, and because of
that, preemption the plaintiff does not have a litigious claim.
4
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2592 (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565-66 n.3 (2009)).
50
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy did not concur and did not give a reason for not concurring.
48

See infra Part III.C.
51
William W. Bratton, Jr., The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism
and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 623-24 (1975); see generally TINSLEY E.

YARBROUGH, THE BURGER COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 126 (2000).

Bratton, supra note 51, at 653; see, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
52
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The Rehnquist Court shifted away from the Burger Court's analysis, while
quoting the Burger Court's decisions as precedent, and held that state law was
preempted in a majority of their cases. Hence, at this time, the Court was still
using the presumption against preemption, but weakened it considerably. 54
The current court, the Roberts Court, has been considerably more
active in the federal preemption market. 5 The Court has been somewhat
sporadic with its decisions and has swayed back and forth between finding
preemption and allowing state law to prevail. The Court has relied on a
regulatory paradigm, whereby it views tort lawsuits as regulatory rather than as
compensatory, and thus they interfere with federal regulatory administrations.
This argument has been applied, however, in cases that find preemption.
Consequently, in those cases that do not find preemption, the Court has been
somewhat unclear about how the regulatory paradigm should be applied." This
trend has left the federal preemption arena in a state of flux. Accordingly, a
clear standard is needed so that (1) injured plaintiffs know if they have any
source of recovery, and (2) the sovereign states know where their regulatory
place is within our dichotomous government. The Attorney General approach,
therefore, could be a clear standard that could be used to fill this void and
provide states with more regulatory power.
Generic Drug Regulation

B.

The regulation of generic drugs has proven to be quite a task for the
FDA. Generic drug manufacturers have become prominent in the marketplace,
which can be seen just by watching a string of television commercials at any
time of day. The influx of generic drugs on the market, however, is a new

53
Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to LitigationAs an Organizing
Theme in the Rehnquist Court'sJurisprudence,84 TEX. L. REv. 1097, 1166 (2006).
54

Id

Wells, supra note 24, at 794 n. 1 (citing Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011);
see Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555, 574-75 (2009); Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008); Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Warner Lambert Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008) (mem. affirming
4-4); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, L.L.C., 544
U.S. 431 (2005)).
56
Id.; see, e.g., PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581-82 (2011); Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323-24 (2008) (Finding that the FDA's premarket approval process
established federal requirements, and patient's New York common-law claims of negligence,
strict liability, and implied warranty against manufacturer were preempted.). Contra Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009).
5

57

Id

Wells, supra note 24, at 794-95; see, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, L.L.C., 544 U.S.
431 (2005).
58
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development, brought in by the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and more lenient
FDA requirements, which are discussed in this section.
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments, as part of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,"5 "allow[ ] a generic
drug manufacturer to gain FDA approval simply by showing that its drug is
equivalent to an already-approved brand-name drug, and that the safety and
efficacy labeling proposed for its drug is the same as that approved for the
brand-name drug." 60 State tort laws, however, generally require that a drug
manufacturer must act accordingly if a change arises, such as an increase in the
number of consumers that have a severe adverse reaction.61 Such a change
would require a more stringent label, treating brand-name and generic drug
manufacturers equally. 62 This difference, wherein the FDA requires
"sameness"63 from the generic drug manufacturers, and the states require any
drug manufacturer to change their label" is where the preemption issue lies.
There are certain processes and remedies that the FDA will allow drug
manufacturers to use when labeling is found insufficient: the "changes being
effected" ("CBE") process and "Dear Doctor Letters."6 Both of these avenues
were at issue in the PLIVA decision. The CBE process allows a brand-name
drug manufacturer to strengthen a warning, precaution, or instruction about
such things as dosage or administration without preapproval by the FDA.66 The
FDA, however, has read this regulation to allow generic drug manufacturers to
change their labels "to match an updated brand-name label or follow the FDA's
instructions. " "Dear doctor" letters, on the other hand, are not as compelling
as the CBE process argument. The "Dear Doctor" letters argument basically
contends that the generic drug manufacturers can send additional warnings to
the persons they are selling to, namely prescribing physicians and healthcare
professionals.6 8 The FDA again argues that this is "labeling" and thus the

59
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.). The
Act is also generally known as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. Mead Johnson Pharm. Grp. v.
Bowen, 838 F.2d 1332, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
60
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2570.

61

Id.

Id. at 2573.
Id. at 2574-75. The Court notes that this means "the [generic drug's] labeling must be the
same as the listed [brand-name] drug product's labeling because the listed drug product is the
basis for [generic drug] approval." Id at 2575.
6
Id. at 2573.
65
Id. at 2570.
66
Id at 2575.
62
63

67
68

Id
Id. at 2576.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss1/17

10

LaFayette: Always Ask for a Brand-Name Drug: Trying to Untangle the Holding

ALWAYS ASK FOR A BRAND-NAME DRUG

2012]

467

generic drug manufacturer must strive for "sameness" and can only send letters
that are consistent with approved drug labeling.
The FDA currently maintains that a generic drug manufacturer can
change drug labels, but only by proposing changes to the FDA.70 The FDA will
then work with the brand-name manufacturer to chanfe the label for both
generic and brand-name forms of the drug, if necessary. The FDA bases this
proposition on the requirement that "labeling shall be revised to include a
warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious
hazard with a drug."72 As a consequence, the generic drug manufacturers, under
the FDA reasoning, only have the duty of asking the agency to work with the
brand-name manufacturer to change the label if it becomes aware of safety
problems.73 The Supreme Court, however, has not addressed the FDA's
argument, as it was only referenced in the holding in PLIVA. 74
III. THE PLIVA DECISION
To understand the FDA's argument, and the argument of the other
parties involved in PLIVA, the background leading up to the lawsuit is pivotal.
This background will also further the understanding of the editor in why an
alternative approach is needed, such as the Attorney General scenario which
this Note discusses in a later section. Part III.A of this Note gives the
background of the PLIVA decision and what led up to the lawsuit. Part III.B
describes the trends the Supreme Court has followed through the regimes of the
Burger Court, the Rehnquist Court, and finally, the Roberts Court. Part III.C
discusses the precursor to the PLIVA decision, the Wyeth case, and why the
Court found the two cases distinguishable from one another. Part III.D delves
into the implications for the missing concurrence from Supreme Court Justice
Kennedy and how it may be the missing link for practitioners and lower courts.
Part III.E reviews Justice Sotomayor's dissenting opinion in PLIVA.
Background

A.

As stated previously, PLIVA arose from two plaintiffs who developed
tardive dyskinesia ("TD") from prolonged use of a generic form of Reglan. TD
is characterized "by involuntary movements of the face, trunk, or extremities,
and is often associated with the prolonged exposure to dopamine receptor
69

Id.

70

Id

71

Id.
Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (2006)); 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(2) (2006) (from which the
FDA bases its practice of working indirectly with generic drug manufacturers).
7
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2576.
74
Id. at 2577.
72
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",75

drugs ... .
Frowning, blinking, chewing, and rolling of the tongue are some
of the involuntary movements that result.76 Additionally, issues with
swallowing, dental issues, respiratory interruptions (such as shortness in
breath), weight loss, and a shorter life expectancy are physical side effects of
TD.7 Further, psychological side effects, such as depression and anxiety, occur
because of the social stigma that ersons affected by TD feel because of the
physical side effects of the disease.
In PLIVA and Wyeth, the preemption issue arose from the FDA's CBE
process and sending "Dear Doctor" letters.79 The plaintiffs in PLIVA argued
that these two processes allowed for the generic drug manufacturers to act in a
similar unilateral fashion to how the brand-name drug manufacturers could in
Wyeth.8 0 The plaintiffs further argued that the holding in Wyeth was controlling
and that the more stringent state law requirements should be upheld against the
generic drug manufacturers.8 Additionally, even if the court held that Wyeth
did not extend to the generic drug manufacturers, the state law regulations were
not preempted because of other avenues the manufacturers could have taken
other than unilateral relabeling, which the FDA forbids for generic drug
manufacturers. 82
The defendants, on the other hand, argued that unlike Wyeth, where the
brand-name manufacturers could act unilaterally to change their labels, the fact
that the defendants could only act if the brand-name manufacturers acted first
made Wyeth inapplicable. The defendants contended that the state regulations
made it impossible for them, as generic drug manufacturers, to act under state
law while obeying federal regulation under the FDA. 84 They further maintained
that there was not a duty for generic drug manufacturers to request a
strengthened label, although the FDA maintained that there was under 21
U.S.C. § 352(f)(2).ss

7
John Baker, Tardive Dyskinesia: Reducing Medical Malpractice Exposure Through A
Risk-Benefit Analysis, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 799, 800 (1997).
76

Id

7

Id. at 806.

78

Id.

7
80

PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2570.
Id.

81

Id at 2573-74.

82

Id at 2570. These avenues were addressed above, in section II.B: the CBE process and the

"Dear Doctor" letters. Id.
8
Id. at 2573.
8
Id.
85

Id. at 2576-77.
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The FDA bases its proposition that a generic drug manufacturer can
only change drug labels by proposing changes to the FDA86 on 21 U.S.C. §
352(f)(2), which it interprets to require that "labeling shall be revised to include
a warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious
hazard with a drug."87 Thus, the only duty that a generic drug manufacturer has,
under the FDA's reasoning, is to ask the agency to work with the brand-name
manufacturer to change the label if it becomes aware of safety problems.8 8 The
FDA's argument, however, has not been addressed by the Supreme Court, and
was only referenced in the holding in PLIVA. 89 The Court did not address this
argument because it found the federal regulation preempted the state tort law,
even assuming a duty existed. 90
Counter-Trends: The Justices' Change in Direction

B.

This section analyzes the change over time in preemption
jurisprudence, starting with an overview of the trends of the Burger Court, then
moving onto the Rehnquist Court, and finally the Roberts Court. These trends
are important to understanding where the Court now stands and how the
preemption landscape has been formed.
1.

The Burger Court

The Burger Court spanned 1969 to 1986 and was supposed to be a
conservative backlash against the liberal policies implemented by the Warren
Court. 91 The Burger Court did not follow the trend of the Warren Court and
traditionally favored state and federal agencies working side-by-side, however,
it was a conservative court that took an inconsistent liberal approach to the
preemption issue. 9 2 The Burger Court upheld state action in areas in which the
Warren Court had vigorously applied federal policies.

86
87

Id.
Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (2006)).

88

Id

89

Id. at 2577.

90

Id.

91

TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE BURGER COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY (2000).

Justices on the Burger Court, led by Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger, were Justices Hugo
Lafayette Black, Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., William Orville Douglas, John
Marshall Harlan, Thurgood Marshall, Sandra Day O'Connor, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H.
Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart, and Byron Raymond White. Id. at 37.
92
Bratton, supra note 51, at 623-24; see generally YARBROUGH, supra note 91, at 126.
93

Bratton, supra note 51, at 623-24.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 17

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

470

[Vol. 115

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Comm 'n94 is an
example of the Burger Court's views on federal preemption. In this case, the
Court held that a California statute conditioning the construction of additional
nuclear plants on the development of an adequate storage and disposal facilities
was constitutional, despite utility companies' challenges.9 5 The Court cited the
long history of dual federal-state regulation in the field of nuclear-power
electrical generation, and the limited conflict between federal and state
regulatory efforts, thus upholding the state's regulatory laws in that area. 96 This
case is indicative of the Court's numerous holdings that "where Congress has
not made clear its intention to preempt, or where a conflict is unripe or
peripheral to the purpose of the federal statute, state legislation will be allowed
to stand." 97
2.

The Rehnquist Court

The Rehnquist Court was commissioned from 1986 until 2005, when
the late William Rehnquist passed away. 98 The Rehnquist Court, a more "right"
court, tended to say it was going one way, usually stating that the presumption
against preemption should be applied in federal preemption cases, but held in
the opposite:
While the Rehnquist Court has, at times, endorsed just such a
"presumption against preemption" in words, it has consistently
rejected such an approach in practice. In cases dealing with a
wide cross-section of regulatory arenas, the Justices have
overwhelmingly sided with those advocating the invalidation
of state regulation and against their erstwhile allies, the states.
Though the numbers have leveled off a bit in the last few
terms, for much of its time together, the Rehnquist Court was
finding preemption in over two-thirds of the cases raising the
issue. During the 1999 and 2000 terms, the Court did itself one
better and found preemption in every single case raising the
issue (seven out of seven). 99

94

461 U.S. 190 (1983).

95

Id.

96

Id
Bratton, supra note 51, at 653.
98
Justices on the Rehnquist Court, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, were Justices Antonin
Scalia, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer, O'Connor, Stevens, Kennedy,
Marshall, Brennan, Thomas, White, Blackmun, Douglas, Powell, and Stewart. TINSLEY E.
YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-36 (2000).
9
Siegel, supra note 53, at 1166.
9
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As the above passage makes clear, the Rehnquist Court was stating one
thing and heading in the opposing direction. Those justices that are usually
known for defending states' rights-Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas-were shown to be a formidable bloc upholding preemption on
several occasions. 00 Accordingly, although the Rehnquist Court strained to
make it appear as though it was taking the same course as its conservative
counterpart, the Burger Court, it was really taking the focus away from states'
rights and moving more toward a presumption of preemption.
On the other hand, three of the seven cases that Siegel notes in his
pronunciation were expressly preempted.o'0 There were, of course, dissents in
all three cases holding that the state regulation was not expressly preempted. 02
Resultantly, there was some argument that the Court could still find that the
state law was not preempted and could stand alongside the federal regulatory
scheme in question. The other four cases, however, used implied preemption
and found that federal law trumped. 03 The Rehnquist Court, therefore, was still

100 Id at 1167; see also The National Legal Center for the Public Interest, Federal
Preemption: The Court Steps Back From States' Rights, 24 No. 11 JUD./LEGIS. WATCH REP. 4
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20050206081857/http://nlcpi.org/
available
(2003)
books/pdf/JLWR OctoberO3.pdf (showing five cases in the 2002-2003 term in which "switchhitting" occurred by the Justices who are usually states' rightists; "[p]erhaps the single most
striking trend of the 2002-2003 Term was the spectacle of a Court that had previously been
obsessed with the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments suddenly 'switch-hitting' on federal
preemption issues").
101 Siegel, supra note 53 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the
Rehnquist Court'sFederalism Decisions, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 429, 462-63 n.222 (2002)); see, e.g.,
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 550-51 (2001) (finding express preemption of
location restrictions on cigarette advertising under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act); Egethoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 142 (2001) (holding that a
state statute governing the rights of divorced spouses under provisions made prior to the divorce
was expressly preempted by the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act); Norfolk S.
Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 347 (2000) (concluding that the Federal Railroad Safety Act
and its implementing regulations expressly preempted state tort claims concerning a railroad's
failure to maintain adequate warning devices at crossings).
102
LorillardTobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 590-605 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Egelhoff 532 U.S. at
153-161 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 529 U.S. at 360-61 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
103
Siegel, supra note 53; see, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,
343 (2001) (ruling that state law claims that a manufacturer committed fraud on the federal Food
and Drug Administration were preempted by federal law); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000) (finding federal preemption of a state law barring state entities
from buying goods or services from companies doing business with Burma); Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000) (determining that a state law tort action posed an obstacle
to the purposes of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act and was therefore preempted); United
States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (finding some state oil spill prevention regulations
preempted by the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act and remanding for a decision on
others).
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showing a willingness to find preemption in situations where it was not clearly
blocked by an express Congressional provision.
3.

The Roberts Court

The Roberts Court spanned from 2005 to the present.' 04 The Roberts
Court has taken on numerous preemption cases and has taken a regulatory view
(rather than a compensatory view whereby states are providing remedies to
citizens rather than simply regulating an area of law) of federal preemption in
those cases. 0 5 The Court, however, has used the regulatory paradigm in cases
both in which it found preemption and those in which it found that state law
was not preempted.106 The Court seems to be taking great leeway with the
federal preemption cases and has left federal preemption open for manipulation
depending on who can manage a majority.'o It seems, however, as though the
more conservative view of old, that would not find preemption (as the Roberts
Court held), has switched to the modem view that preemption should be found
more often than not.108
The Roberts Court has left itself this additional room because of its
characterization of what "regulatory" means in federal preemption cases.1 09 The
Court has held that tort lawsuits are regulatory in nature, and that these lawsuits
thus interfere with administrative regulatory regimes. 110 Hence, the door has
been opened to allow for federal defendants to make a strong case for
preemption against state regulatory schemes that lead to private cause of
actions. Even in Wyeth, where the outcome was against preemption, the Court
found that the tort system was "acting as 'a complementary form of drug
regulation' in which '[s]tate tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and
provide incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks
promptly.""'

10
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court John G. Roberts, Jr., United States
Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas,
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, and United States Supreme Court Justice
Elena Kagan. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, UnitedStates Supreme Court Justices, Encyclopedia
Britannica Online Academic Edition. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 2012. Web.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/l 788861/United-States-Supreme-Court-Justices
(last visited Sept. 1, 2012). Justice Souter served until 2009. Id.
105 Wells, supra note 24, at 794.
106 Id.; see e.g., PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581-82
(2011); Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323-24 (2008). Contra Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009).
107 See Wells, supra note 24, at 794.
los Id. at 795.
109

Id.

110

Id

"'

Id at 811-12 (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 578-79).
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The "compensatory paradigm," in contrast, views state tort lawsuits
and regulations as methods of controlling conduct through obligating
defendants to pay compensation.1 2 This paradigm was used early on by the
Roberts Court to uphold state regulation.' 13 The compensatory paradigm is
traditionally used where there is no explicit preemption clause in the legislation
in question and the breadth of the possible preemption of state law is vast. 114
This paradigm is used by the Justices who are in the minority of the PLIVA
opinion.' 5 and can lead to the uncertainty that has been shown in the Roberts
Courts' decisions. In the compensatory cases "the Court [has] found against
preemption because it viewed common law tort verdicts as not having an effect
on businesses similar enouph to statutes and regulations to amount to
conflicting legal mandates."" As stated above, however, the trend in the Court
now is the adoption of the regulatory paradigm in both for-preemption and
against-preemption cases, leaving even more uncertainty as to what argument
will lead to what end." 7
C.

Pre-PLIVA: The Wyeth Decision

This section will provide a short summary of Wyeth and the
background of that case. Because Wyeth was the precursor to PLIVA, it is
important to review how the Court was able to split hairs between the brandname manufactures involved in Wyeth and generic name manufacturers in
PLIVA. Thus, the latter part of this section connects Wyeth to the decision in
PLIVA and discusses why the Court had different holdings in the two cases.
1.

A General Overview of Wyeth

Wyeth, as it has been alluded to in this Note, also resulted from a
failure-to-warn claim that dealt with the labeling requirements of brand-name
drugs on the federal and state level."' The plaintiff had been administered an
anti-nausea medication, Phenergan, with the IV-push method." 9 This resulted

112

"
114
"
116

431
117
118
119

Wells, supra note 24, at 794.
Id. at 804, 812; see Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 474 (2008).
See generally Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 489.
PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2592 (2011).
Wells, supra note 24, at 794-95; see, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, L.L.C., 544 U.S.
(2005).
Wells, supra note 24, at 795.
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558-61 (2009).
The Court noted that:
[Phenergan] can be administered .

.

. intravenously .

.

. through either the

"IV-push" method, whereby the drug is injected directly into a patient's vein,
or the "IV-drip" method, whereby the drug is introduced into a saline
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in the onset of gangrene and the amputation of the patient's arm.12 0 Although
the states required a stricter standard of labeling than the FDA, the Court
upheld the state regulation against the preemption claims.12' The Court held
that the brand-name drug manufacturers could unilaterally change their label to
make it stronger and to comply with state law.122 The Court felt that it was
possible for the manufacturers to comply with both federal and state law,
resulting in the demise of the impossibility preemption argument raised by the
defendant.' 2 3 The Court additionally found that requiring the manufacturer to
comply with the stronger state law did not obstruct the purposes and objectives
of federal drug labeling regulation because of the FDA's mixed signals and the
statutory language of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act ("FDCA").124
The Court saw the federal labeling standards, and believed the FDA did too, as
a "floor upon which [s]tates could build."' 25
Wyeth followed the regulatory paradigm discussed previously;
however, it was only followed because the regulatory aspects of state tort law
were non-conflicting (it was not a pure regulatory paradigm case).' 2 6 Wyeth
thus is an example of when federal preemption has not been found while using
the Roberts Court's regulatory argument, viewing tort suits as simply a
regulatory function of the state.127 Further, although the FDA had "recently
adopted [the] position that state tort suits interfere with its statutory mandate,"
the Court afforded it no weight.12 8 The Court did, however, find the lack of
express preemption and the "long-standing coexistence of state and federal
law" under the FDA enough to find that the state regulatory scheme could
coexist with that of the federal scheme.' 2 9
2.

Distinguishing Between Wyeth and PLIVA

The Court found in PLIVA that the brand-name versus generic
prescription drug distinction made the underlying issue distinguishable from
solution in a hanging intravenous bag and slowly descends through a catheter
inserted in a patient's vein. [Phenergan] is corrosive and causes irreversible
gangrene if it enters a patient's artery.

Id. at 559.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 558-59, 566-69.
122
Id. at 573.
123

124

Id. at 579-81.
Id. at 574-80.

125

Id. at 577.

126

Wells, supra note 24, at 811-12.
Id.
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581.

127

128
129

Id.
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Wyeth. 130 Because the brand-name drug manufacturers could act unilaterally,
they were able to comply with both state and federal law, something the generic
drug manufacturer could not do because of its reliance on the brand-name
manufacturers under the FDA's regulations.'
The Court focused, as it believed the Wyeth majority had, on the
unilateral action a brand-name manufacturer could take under the CBE
process.132 Because the federal statutes and regulations were "meaningfully
different" as applied to brand-name manufacturers compared to generic
manufacturers, a different finding of preemption was logical.1 3 The majority
conceded that Congress's scheme may be "unusual or even bizarre," but that
because of the legislative scheme governing prescription drug manufacturers,
the Court would not distort the Supremacy Clause in order to change an
outcome that made "little sense" from the plaintiffs' perspectives.13 4 Thus,
because of the special regulation for generic drugs under the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments, which were meant to expand the generic drug market quickly, a
dissimilar preemption outcome was applied to a "dissimilar statutory

scheme."

35

Justice Kennedy's Missing Concurrence

D.

Justice Kennedy concurs in all but section III part B-2 of the PLIVA
decision, which deals with the application of the so-called non obstante
provision of the Supremacy Clause.136 In this section, the Court reasoned that
the text of the Supremacy Clause allows for a reading that there is a "non
obstante provision in the Supremacy Clause [and it] ... suggests that federal

law should be understood to impliedly repeal conflicting state law."' 3 7 The
Court held that because of the provision, it only needed to look at the
"'ordinary meaning' of federal law, and should not distort federal law to
accommodate conflicting state law."' 38
Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the rest of the majority opinion,
opted out of concurring with this section, but did not write an opinion to give

133

PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581-82 (2011).
Id. at 2574-75.
Id. at 2581-82.
Id

134

id.

130

''
132

Id. at 2582 (noting that "[a]s always, Congress and the FDA retain the authority to change
the law and regulations if they so desire").
136
Id. at 2571, 2579-81.
135

Id. at 2580.
Id. (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 588 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment)).
137
138
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his reasoning.' 3 9 Justice Kennedy is known for his concurring opinions because
of his place as the "swing vote," not only on the Roberts Court, but historically
on the Rehnquist Court. 40 It is clear, however, that Justice Kennedy sits as the
"pivot" on the Roberts Court.14' Because he is usually the split in the five to
four decisions, 42 such as PLIVA,143 his concurrence would likely help the case
editor to understand the reasoning for his vote in this case. Under the
circumstances, it is interesting that in such a close case, on a paramount issue,
he opted out of writing a concurrence on one section that only takes up about a
page and a half of the decision.'" Further, it is even more perplexing that there
is not a single comment from Kennedy when Thomas himself, the majority
penman, opted out of writing this section.145
Although Kennedy seems to be devoted to states' rights, "[he] has been
quite willing to find federal preemption when it serves deregulation
purposes."l46 Ergo, it would seem that he would agree with the majority on the
non obstante provision reasoning because it gives more power to uphold a
federal preemption finding and allow state deregulation.14 7 Kennedy, however,
refuses to concur and offers no reasoning to the editor.14 8 It is, consequently,
unclear why Kennedy did not iterate why he did not join a small part of the
majority opinion, especially one that may continue to be used hereafter. It is,
however, a particularly important piece of the case to take note of for practicing
attorneys who may come up against a federal preemption question. Arguing
against, or not arguing, the non obstante provision contention may,
consequently, win favor with the swing justice.

19

Id. at 2571, 2579-81.

See generally N. Feldman, Justice Anthony Kennedy Swings Key Supreme CourtDecisions,
STAR TRIB. (June 2, 2011), http://www.startribune.com/opinion/123060468.html.
141
Michael C. Blumm & Sherry L. Bosse, Justice Kennedy and the Environment: Property,
States' Rights, and a Persistent Search for Nexus, 82 WASH. L. REv. 667, 667 (2007). See also
Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 63, 85-87 (1996). Justice Kennedy was given the title of "Most
Dangerous Justice" based on a review of the decisions from 1994-1995. Id. The authors noted
that during the 1994 Term, Kennedy participated in seventeen five-Justice majorities. Id.
142
In the Supreme Court's 2006 term, Justice Kennedy was the deciding vote in all twentyfour of the Court's five-member majority decisions. Jason Harrow, Justice Kennedy's
Remarkable OT06, SCOTUSBLOG, (June 28, 2007, 5:20 PM), http:// www.scotusblog.com
/2007/06/justice-kennedys-remarkable-ot06.
143
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2571.
144 Id. at 2579-81.
145
Id. at 2571.
146
Blumm & Bosse, supra note 141.
147
The Author refers to "state deregulation" as when the Court finds that a state's tort laws
and regulations are preempted by a federal law or regulation.
148
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2579-81.
140
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The lack of concurrence is important because Kennedy has the power
to swing a five to four vote in a split case.' 49 Because of the current
composition of the Court, it is worthwhile to know what Justice Kennedy
believes because of the weight of his vote. 50 Additionally, the back and forth
decisions of the Court on the federal preemption issue may be affected by how
Justice Kennedy feels about the case. Because PLIVA was a five to four
decision, a similar case may be accepted by the Court and afford a chance for a
clearer response from Justice Kennedy, and possibly a change in the holding. '5
E.

Justice Sotomayor'sDissent

Justice Sotomayor challenges the majority's findings, and specifically
its test for impossibility preemption, in her dissent. 5 2 Further, she finds that the
split from Wyeth is incorrect,' 53 especially because generic drugs make up
almost 75% of the prescription drug market because of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments, which implemented separate regulatory standards for generic
drug manufacturers in order to allow them to make the drugs more cheaply.154
1.

Treating Generic Drugs Differently?

Justice Sotomayor agrees with the majority that generic manufacturers
also bear resPonsibility under federal law "for monitoring the adequacy of their
warnings." 5 She further agrees that generic drug manufacturers cannot act
unilaterally through the processes that the Plaintiffs had suggested, the CBE

149

Harrow, supra note 142.

Id
A case that is currently pending, given an extension for a response petition until October
31, 2012, will provide such an opportunity for Justice Kennedy. The case that is being appealed
from the First Circuit involves a woman who was given a generic drug, not by her own choosing,
but by the pharmacy's choosing. The court noted that "[the plaintiff] having lost her warning
claim by the mere chance of her drug store's selection of a generic, the Supreme Court might be
less ready to deprive Bartlett of her remaining avenue of relief." Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc.,
U.S.L.W. _ (U.S. July 31, 2012)
678 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2012), petition for cert filed,
http://www.hpm.com/pdf/blog/SULINDAC%20at
available
,
(No.
%20Bartlett/o2OSup%2OCt%2OCert%2OPet.pdf. Further, there was a federal preemption case
heard in June 2012, however, it dealt with field preemption and did not deal with FDA
regulations. It is important, though, because Justice Kennedy again did not take the opportunity
to express his views on the non obstanteprovision. Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prod. Corp., 132 S. Ct.
1261 (2012).
152
PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2582-85 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
150
151

153

Id. at 2588-90.

154

Id. at 2583-84.

'

Id. at 2585.
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process and the "Dear Doctor" letters.15 6 Justice Sotomayor disagrees with the
PLIVA majority, however, and argues that generic drug manufacturers cannot
simply continue blindly distributing a generic drug when they find an issue
with its labeling:
FDA regulations require that labeling "be revised to include a
warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an
association of a serious hazard with a drug." The FDA
construes this regulation to oblige generic manufacturers "to
seek to revise their labeling and provide FDA with supporting
information about risks" when they believe that additional
warnings are necessary. 157
She finds that the generic drug manufacturers have two duties: they must, under
federal law, monitor their products' safety, and approach the FDA to propose a
label change when an issue arises that they believe requires a change.158
2.

The Preemption Defense

Justice Sotomayor relies heavily on Wyeth's language, which the Court
had used just two years before PLIVA, in her argument against the majority's
finding of preemption, emphasizing that States traditionally regulate health and
safety matters and that Congress had not expressly preempted this area (but was
in fact silent).' 59 She moves on to discuss the impossibility preemption
defense 60 that the majority found to be proven.' 6 ' Justice Sotomayor is taken
aback by the fact that a mere possibility of impossibility would be enough, and
finds that because the Manufacturers had an available mechanism for changing

156

Id

1

Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (2010)).

Id. at 2586.
Id at 2586-87.
The States have traditionally regulated health and safety matters.
Notwithstanding Congress' "certain awareness of the prevalence of state tort
litigation" against drug manufacturers, Congress has not expressly preempted state-law tort actions against prescription drug manufacturers,
whether brand-name or generic. To the contrary, when Congress amended
the FDCA in 1962 to "enlarg[e] the FDA's powers to 'protect the public
health' and 'assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs,' [it] took
care to preserve state law."
Id at 2586 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567, 575 (2009)).
160 The impossibility defense is an affirmative defense; a defendant must "demonstrate that
'compliance with both federal and state [law] is a physical impossibility."' PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at
2587 (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963)). "The
existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant pre-emption of state
law." Id. (citing Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)).
158
159

161

Id at 2578-79.
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the label (by asking the FDA to change it), it was not impossible to fulfill the
requirements of both state and federal law.16 2 She concludes that the scenario in
PLIVA is not that different from the scenario in Wyeth.16 3 She finds that brandname manufacturers must still have approval from the FDA to change their
labels; accordingly, she believes the argument that the capability of unilateral
action is needed in order for non-preemption cannot stand.'6
She concludes by finding three problems with the majority's
preemption analysis. 165 First, the new impossibility preemption test has no basis
in the Court's precedents, especially not in Wyeth.166 Second, the majority
could have found that conflict preemption was not present without rendering it
"illusory" because it can be found without impossibility; rather it can be found
"where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'"16 Third, the majority should not
have adopted the non obstante provision approach because the Court has
historically directed that "congressional action does not supersede 'the historic
police powers of the States . . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress."'l 6 8 She reiterates this point again with language from Wyeth:
When federal law provides actors with a mechanism for
attempting to comply with their state-law duties, "respect for
the States as 'independent sovereigns in our federal system"'
should require those actors to attempt to comply with state law
before being heard to complain that compliance with both laws

was impossible."

69

Justice Sotomayor found that a divergent scheme of liability law has
emerged because (1) the majority incorrectly applied the doctrine of
impossibility and in fact "invents" its own doctrine just for this case; 70 (2) the
majority incorrectly allows the silence of Congress to outweigh the states'
traditional role in health and safety issues;' 7 ' (3) the majority incorrectly
believes that this follows the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
when, in reality, it will likely make states cut back on the allowance afforded

162
163
'6
165
166
167

Id. at 2582, 2587-88.
Id at 2588.

Id at 2588-89.
Id. at 2590.
Id. at 2589-90.
Id. at 2590 (quoting Crosby v. Nat'1 Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)).

170

Id. at 2590-92 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
Id. at 2592 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565-66 n.3 (2009)).
Id. at 2582-83.

1'

Id. at 2586-87.

168
169
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generic drug manufacturers;' 72 (4) the majority incorrectly found that there
were no unilateral actions that generic drug manufacturers could take;' 7 3 and
(5) the majority incorrectly found that a person should have recourse when
prescribed a brand-name drug, but not a generic drug.174 Thus, Justice
Sotomayor, and her dissenting counterparts,' 7 5 would find that persons injured
by inadequate labeling of a generic drug have the same actionable rights as
those who are prescribed a brand-name drug.'76
This dissent is important, therefore, because it leaves an avenue for
plaintiffs who may be able to find a loophole in the PLIVA holding. Because of
the Court's swing vote atmosphere at the moment, a change in facts or
circumstances may make the Court more amenable to change. Although at this
time it is unlikely to change unless a new scheme is adopted, as discussed in the
next section of this Note, the arguments made by the dissent will be helpful to
practitioners in framing their future arguments if there is a change in the
makeup of the Court or a change in federal preemption regime.
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AFTER PLIVA

Because the Court held that Wyeth, which held that brand-name drug
manufacturers were held to state law regulations,' 77 did not extend to generic
drug manufacturers, 78 two questions remain: (1) why generic drug
manufacturers are more protected than their brand-name drug manufacturer
counterparts and (2) where the federal preemption line should be drawn.
Subsequently, Part IV.A discusses the protection now afforded to generic drug
manufacturers versus their brand-name counterparts. Finally, Part IV.B reviews
two federal district court cases that were decided after PLIVA. These two cases
differ substantially from each other and show how PLIVA can be easily
followed or how loopholes in the case may be exploited, further emphasizing
the need for more clarity in the preemption arena.
A.

The UnbalancedOutcome: Why Generic Drugs Are Afforded More
Protection

Justice Sotomayor points out in her dissent that the only difference
between generic drugs and brand-name drugs is the name and the percentage of

172
'

14
17

Idat 2593.
Id. at 2588-89.

Id. at 2592.

Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan all joined in Justice Sotomayor's
dissent. Id. at 2582.
17
Id. at 2593.
1n
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
178
See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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sales that each make.179 It is even more alarming that the majority opinion
points out that if the plaintiffs had been given the brand-name drug, instead of
the generic drug, they would have a claim. 80 The Hatch-Waxman
Amendments,1st meant to help consumers,182 are now hurting them by
preempting state tort law claims for persons whose prescriptions are filled with
the generic form of the drug.183 This is an outcome which would not have
occurred but for the Supreme Court's recent preemption decisions.
This section of this Note provides a survey of three different
preemption arguments for and against the imbalance between brand-name
manufacturers and generic drug manufacturers. The first argument is against
the imbalance, which focuses primarily on the lack of FDA oversight that leads
to the contention that generic drug manufacturers should be held liable to tort
suits. The second argument is a middle ground argument which would hold
generic drug manufacturers for primary liability and the brand-name
manufacturers for secondary liability. The last argument is similar to the
majority's argument in PLIVA and would find that generic drug manufacturers
should be held to separate requirements when confronted with state tort
liability.
1.

Issues with FDA Oversight

An issue that has been prevalent for some time is the lack of oversight
that the FDA has wielded as of late.184 Government studies and surveys of FDA
scientists have shown that the FDA has some real concerns when dealing with
the oversight of drug manufacturers. 85 These studies have found that the FDA
is "currently unable to protect the public from unsafe drugs and devices

..
Iso

Id. at 2582-84 (stating that generic drugs make up seventy-five percent of the market).
The Court stated:
Had Mensing and Demahy taken Reglan, the brand-name drug prescribed by
their doctors, Wyeth would control and their lawsuits would not be preempted. But because pharmacists, acting in full accord with state law,
substituted generic metoclopramide instead, federal law preempts these
lawsuits .... We acknowledge the unfortunate hand that federal drug
regulation has dealt Mensing, Demahy, and others similarly situated.

Id. at 2581-82.
181
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.). The
Act is also generally known as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments..
182
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2583.
113
Id. at 2593.
184
Elizabeth J. Cabraser, When Worlds Collide: The Supreme Court Confronts Federal
Agencies with Federalism in Wyeth v. Levine, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1284-86 (2010).
185
id
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adequately"l 86 and that "[a]lmost seventy percent [of FDA scientists] did not
believe the FDA had sufficient resources to effectively perform its mission of
protecting public health and helping the public get the accurate, science-based
information needed to use medicines and foods to improve its health....".
Because of the obstacles that the FDA has faced and currently faces, it
seems as though the public is at a serious disadvantage when needing
compensation for injuries that have occurred because of a generic drug issue.
Further evidence has shown that it is common for drugs to be approved by the
FDA without extensive studies of their safety and that "82 of the 174 products
approved between January 1995 and June 2007 in the United States and/or the
European Union . . . were subject to subsequent safety-related regulatory

actions."' 88 These problems seem to stem from several shortcomings of the
FDA: little post approval oversight, systemic lack of post approval studies,
inability to stay astride with adverse event reports, and unknown safety issues
prior to FDA approval.189As a result, the FDA has created a situation where
consumers are at a higher risk of injury with a lower chance of receiving
compensation in the event of an injury, both consequences that the average
consumer likely does not take into account when the local pharmacist fills his
prescription with the generic form of the prescribed medication.
On the other hand, the argument can be made that the FDA is balancing
the desire to release drugs quickly so that diseases can be cured earlier and the
desire to protect consumers from unwanted side effects of improperly tested
prescription drugs that require longer and additional studies. The author of this
Note would argue, however, that because the brand-name drug must undergo
these longer studies, this cannot be a strong desire of the FDA. If it truly
wanted to decrease the time between the creation of a drug and the time the
drug is placed on the market, the FDA would decrease the requirements for
brand-name drug manufacturers also. 190 Additionally, if the average consumer
was aware up-front of the lack of extensive studies and the serious side effects
of the prescription being taken (as in the case of the PLIVA plaintiffs), then
there would likely be a reduced call by the consumer to have a new drug
immediately placed on the market.
The current state of the FDA's regulatory process shows that the
current liability scheme may not work and will leave injured consumers

186

187

Id at 1284.
Id at 1285 (citation omitted).

18
Id. at 1287. The author also notes that "[t]hree years after approval, fourteen percent were
the subject of a regulatory action; by ten years after approval, twenty-nine percent were the
subject of a regulatory action." Id. (citing Catherine D. DeAngelis & Phil B. Fontanaosa,
Prescription Drugs, Product Liability, and Preemption of Tort Litigation, 300 JAMA 1939
(2008)).

"8

Id. at 1287-1289.

190

See supra Part III.A.
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without recourse.19 1 If state tort law continues to be federally preempted for
generic drug manufacturers, then Congress or the FDA itself should take steps
to ensure that more stringent precautions are taken by the FDA (which may be
the only protection that consumers of generic drugs now have). Otherwise, the
argument must stay that generic drug manufacturers will not be held liable for
the wrongs that they impose, while brand-name manufacturers will be held
liable. 19 2 A generic drug, not properly regulated by the FDA at the outset, will
reach a consumer who, if injured, will not have a compensation option.' 9 3 The
Court found in Wyeth that state tort suits do perform essential functions that the
FDA cannot: they "uncover unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for
drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly," and "[they also serve a
distinct compensatory function that may motivate injured persons to come
forward with information."' 9 4 The Court has, therefore, found that state tort
suits do have their place in filling the gap where the FDA cannot,19 5 and it can
be argued that the same should be applied to generic drug manufacturers.
2.

Make Brand-Name Drug Manufacturers Liable for Generic
Drug Issues

This section discusses two federal preemption arguments that would
hold brand-name drug manufacturers liable for issues with generic drugs. Part a
discusses a case from the California Court of Appeals which held a brand-name
drug manufacturer liable, but not its generic drug counterpart, although the
generic drug manufacturer was technically the tortious wrongdoer in the case.
Part b reviews an argument which would hold both manufacturers liable, based
on a dichotic damages scheme that would have the generic drug manufacturer
primarily liable and the brand-name manufacturer secondarily liable.
a.

The Conte Case

In Conte v. Wyeth, a California Court of Appeals found that a brandname drug manufacturer may be held liable in some instances for tortious
conduct of a generic drug manufacturer that caused a plaintiffs injuries.' 9 6 The
court did not hold the generic drug manufacturer liable because it did not
supply the information that the physician used in prescribing the drug.197 This is

191
192

PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581-82.
Id.

193

id

194

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577-79 (2009).
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581-82.
Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 307-318.

195
196

1
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only one case that found this way, however, and a subsequent federal court
decision criticized the decision for being in contrast to every other decision that
a court has handed down on the issue.'98
This argument would contend that a brand-name drug manufacturer,
who was the first to disseminate information about the drug and thus what
physician's relied upon when prescribing a "like" generic form of the drug,
should be liable where a generic drug manufacturer cannot be found liable.
Because this argument seems to stretch the possibilities of this area of law, and
because only one court has advocated it in the face of severe criticism, this
argument seems fairly unlikely to ever have a strong hold in the federal
preemption jurisprudence.2 oo
This argument is not strong, especially considering the state of the law
at present. It would be a complete turnaround from where the Supreme Court
has settled in PLIVA. Further, it does seem to place the "unfairness" quotient
that is applied to consumers under PLIVA squarely on brand-name drug
manufacturers. This would be a hard policy to uphold because the generic drug
manufacturer would still be free to injure consumers prescribed the generic
form without any repercussions directly against the generic drug manufacturer.
b.

Holding Both Brand-Name and Generic Manufacturers
Liable

Another argument heralded by constitutional scholar and professor of
law Allen Rostron is that, where appropriate, a plaintiff could assert a claim
against both the brand-name and generic drug manufacturers. 2 0 1 He contends
that in the scenario where a consumer takes the generic form of a drug which
caused injuries but the brand-name manufacturer also was negligent in
designing the product or failing to give adequate warnings, the generic
manufacturer should "bear primary liability for the plaintiffs injuries, with the
brand-name manufacturer having only secondary liability in the event that the
generic drug maker has gone out of business or is otherwise unable to pay the
damages."2 Under those circumstances, both manufacturers would be liable
for their significant roles in the injury.

Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00396-JCM-(GWF), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29550, at
*10 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2009). The Eighth and Fourth Circuits have also held that brand-name
manufacturers cannot be held liable for generic drug manufacturers' harm. Mensing v. Wyeth,
Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 613 (8th Cir. 2009); Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th
Cir. 1994).
1' Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 304-05
198

Foster,29 F.3d at 165; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 603.
Allen Rostron, Prescriptionfor Fairness: A New Approach to Tort Liability of BrandName and Generic DrugManufacturers, 60 DUKE L.J. 1123, 1128 (2011).
202
Id. at 1128-29.
200

201
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Rostron's proposal, however, was given before the PLIVA decision was
handed down.20 3 It may be a good foundational framework, however, if the
issue is revisited and the Court needs a way to ignore its precedent in PLIVA
and go in a new direction. This burden-sharing scenario seems to strike a
balance that mirrors that which the FDA has put through with the FDCA and
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, whereby the generic drug manufacturers are
less liable than their brand-name counterparts but still have some avenues for
remedying issues that arise. Thus, if there is a change in tide in the federal
preemption framework, which has been seen over the changing
majority/minority platforms, this may be a comfortable position for those
"sitting on the fence."
Rostron's proposal does seem to be a strong argument that would
comfortably fit with a five to four Supreme Court majority. The problem,
however, is that it does directly place liability on the generic drug manufacturer
in a private action. 2 04 This concept is hard to square with the current federal
preemption doctrine. Another alternative may need to be a stepping point
between the current holding in PLIVA and this argument, reducing the whiplash
of a dramatic shift in Supreme Court precedent. As far as policy is concerned,
however, this seems to be a strong argument because it holds all tortious parties
responsible while allowing for the current state of federal regulation to have
some impact on the separation of liability.
3.

Generic Drug Manufacturers Should Be Treated Differently

This section of the Note reviews two scenarios that, if implemented,
would treat generic drug manufacturers differently than brand-name
manufacturers. Part a discusses the "attorney general" argument, which would
allow a state's attorney general to bring suit in place of a private citizen. Part b
delves into the "completely block" liability argument, which would block all
private suits against generic drug manufactures, such as the one in PLIVA.
a.

Attorney General Scenario

Another scheme that has been proposed by Jason Miller in his student
Note is to allow state attorneys general to bring suits on behalf of consumers,
but to block private actions. 2 05 This scheme, he argues, could be implemented

203
The PLIVA decision was delivered in June of 2011, while Rostron's article was published
in February of 2011. PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011); Rostron, supra note 201, at
1123; see Table of Contents, 60 DUKE L.J. i (2011).
204
Rostron, supra note 201, at 1128.
205 See generally Jason C. Miller, Note, When and How to Defer to the FDA: Learningfrom
Michigan's Regulatory Compliance Defense, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 565, 567
(2009).
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either generally, for all prescription drugs, or for generic drugs specifically. 206
Then, the FDA's focus on allowing generic drugs more leeway in order to
produce a more low-cost system of production would still be feasible, but there
would also be a form of protection for consumers.20 7 The problem, however, is
that Congress would need to act before a state could adopt an alternative like
the state attorney general model if it was to be applied to generic drug
manufacturers.
This shortcoming may lead to the argument's demise. It could,
however, prove to be a good tactic for a state that wishes to still have some
control over its state tort liability structure and allow more protection of its own
citizens. Hence, if states want to try a semi-legitimate loophole to the problem,
but still keep generic drug manufacturers more protected and satisfy the FDA,
this may be the way out. Because of PLIVA's holding that states cannot
implement regulation that would allow private actions against generic drug
manufacturers,20 8 the attorney general model will allow states to give some sort
of action for harmed persons in their jurisdiction.
This argument will likely require a large amount of movement at the
grass roots level, but is currently the best argument for a way out of applying
the PLIVA holding. States will likely be more open to the suggestion because it
will allow them to have more control; additionally, state legislators will likely
have an easy pitch to constituents who are prescribed generic drug a majority of
the time. Further, the argument takes into account that generic drug
manufacturers are treated differently under current federal regulation, but still
allows a remedy against tortious injuries.
b.

Completely Block Liability Scenario

This scenario mirrors that of the majority opinion in PLIVA, arguing
that there is no private action remedy for those injured by a generic drug
manufacturer whose labels are inadequately labeled. 20 9 Because of the FDA
regulations, the argument can be made that it is impossible for a generic
manufacturer to comply with federal law while complying with more strict
labeling regulations of the states.2lo In a predictive student Note, Hannah
Murray foresaw that the Court would find that because of the FDA's longasserted perspective that "generic manufacturers may not modify their drug
warning labels" and because the FDA had opposed generic modifications of the
206
207
208

Id. at 571.
Id. at 585.
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2568.

Id. at 2577-78.
Hannah B. Murray, Note, Generic Preemption:Applying Conflict PreemptionAfter Wyeth
v. Levine, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 255, 269 (2009); see also PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at
2578.
209

210
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brand-name drug, state tort law claims were completely preempted against
generic drug manufacturers.2 1'
This contention follows suit behind that of the PLIVA majority and
would clearly find that generic drug manufacturers, because of the special
statutory scheme afforded them under federal law, are not liable to private
actions in state tort lawsuits. Because state tort claims are completely blocked
for generic drug manufacturers under this argument, it parallels the holding of
PLIVA that plaintiffs do not have a cognizable failure-to-warn claim against
generic drug manufacturers for insufficient labeling. 2 12
B.

Application in the Lower Courts

The previously discussed alternatives are especially important when
one surveys the cases rising through the federal system. Federal courts, now
attempting to apply PLIVA, are churning out prime examples of the confusion
created in preemption law. More poignantly, two Federal District Court cases
show signs of what is occurring and will likely continue to occur in the lower
federal courts. The first, Schedin v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm. Inc., 213
involved a suit against a brand-name manufacturer for failing to warn about
certain risks, notably tendon rupture which occurred in the plaintiffs cases,
when a patient would take the drug Levaquin. 2 14 The second, Brasley-Thrash v.
Teva,215 involved a plaintiff who initiated a failure-to-warn claim against a
generic drug manufacturer who administered the same drug as in PLIVAReglan-but in generic form. The plaintiff in Brasley-Thrash also developed
tardive dyskinesia.216
1.

Application to Brand-Name Manufacturers

The Minnesota District Court found in Schedin that the brand-name
drug manufacturer defendant could not use PLIVA in order to avoid a state
failure-to-warn claim.217 The defendant argued that it should be given a new
trial because a jury verdict against it was against the clear weight of evidence
and because PLIVA should control in its case.2 18 The Court found first that the

211 Murray, supra note 210, at 270-77.
212
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581; Murray, supra note 210, at 274.
213
214
215

Schedin v. Ortho McNeil Janssen Pharm., Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Minn. 2011).
Id at 908.
Brasley-Thrash v. Teva, No. 10-00031-KD-N, 2011 WL 4025734 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 12,

2011).
216

Id at *1.

217

See Schedin, 776 F. Supp. 2d at 915-16.
Id. at 908-09.

218
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preemption analysis of Wyeth, not PLIVA, was controlling because the
defendant was a brand-name drug manufacturer, despite the defendant's claims
that PLIVA should still be applied. 2 19 The Court further found that the
defendant had not met its requirement to show "clear evidence" that the FDA
would not have approved a label change had the defendant asked for one. 220
The defendant had submitted to the Court citizens' petitions from the FDA that
stated that it did not believe that a label change was required.2 2 1 The Court
found that because the petitions were written in 2005, 2006, and 2007, a time at
which the FDA had the authority to require a label change, and it was not in
response to the defendant or a manufacturer asking for a label change, it did not
meet Wyeth or PLIVA's requirements for demonstrating impossibility
preemption.22 2 The defendant, thus, was held to a heightened duty under both
Wyeth and PLIVA because it was a brand-name manufacturer.22 3
This case shows a path that the lower courts will likely follow when
dealing with brand-name prescription drug manufacturers. Because both Wyeth
and PLIVA emphasize the higher standard applied to brand-name
manufacturers, most lower courts, it can be surmised, will follow in the same
footsteps as the Minnesota District Court. It must be remembered, however,
that defendants will always have novel defenses and that this case only shows
one of them. Although it did not work in this case, this defense or some other
may work in the future. Additionally, it is yet to be seen what will count as
"clear evidence" that the FDA would not approve a change in a label.
Depending on whether the threshold is set higher or lower by the lower federal
courts, the Supreme Court may once again have to review part of its test in this
area once the first hurdle of preemption is cleared.
2.

Application to Generic Drug Manufacturers

The Alabama District Court seemed to address the PLIVA holding by
allowing loopholes for the plaintiffs in Brasley-Thrash.2 2 4 In Brasley-Thrash,
the Court issued an order allowing the plaintiff to amend her complaint after
the PLIVA holding was announced during the course of the litigation.225 The
order was simply one to allow the plaintiff to amend her complaint once the

219
220
221
222
223

Id at 909-10.
Id at 910-11.
Id. at 912.

id
id

Brasley-Thrash v. Teva, No. 10-00031-KD-N, 2011 WL 4025734, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Sept.
12, 2011).
22
Id at*1.
224
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PLIVA holding was announced.226 The defendant argued simply that because
the plaintiffs claim was preempted by the PLIVA holding, the plaintiffs effort
would be useless.22 7 The Court, however, found that it could distinguish the
plaintiffs claim from that in PLIVA. 228 It found that the plaintiff was merely
asserting that the defendant should have sent "Dear Doctor" letters about the
approved warning label (reiterating the warnings on the approved label), not
that it should have sent letters that did not coordinate with the FDA approved
warning label.229
This order is important to note because it seems as though this may be
the way that some lower federal courts will handle the PLIVA holding. The
lower courts may claim to follow PLIVA but ultimately give way for plaintiffs
that they feel have a claim, despite their being given the generic form of a drug
at the pharmacy window. If other courts follow suit, it may soon turn out that
another case will be ripe for the Supreme Court's taking in order to tie up loose
ends that they may not have seen in PLIVA.
V. CONCLUSION

The policy that has been set forth in PLIVA, that only certain drug
consumers are protected, should not be one that the Court upholds. The lack of
alternatives other than private action, because of the FDA's current failure to
fully regulate drug manufacturing and drug labeling, makes it clear that there is
a need for some sort of repercussion against generic drug manufacturers who
otherwise have minimal responsibility at this point. If a similar case is heard,
the Supreme Court should seriously consider the message it has sent that there
is no remedy for a consumer who is injured by a truly guilty party. The
alternatives provided in this Note are points that the Court may consider;
however, there are pros and cons to each one. The easiest alternative may be
the attorney general argument, which leaves the states with the power to protect
consumers if a serious threat is raised by a generic drug manufacturer by
allowing the attorney general to bring a suit against the manufacturer. The
argument will also allow the Supreme Court to save face by treating the generic
drug manufacturers, still protected from a direct private action, differently than
brand-name drug manufacturers.
PLIVA is an important turning point in the Roberts Court's preemption
jurisprudence. Because the Court had previously left itself leeway because of
the regulatory framework it preferred to use, it seems that it has now drawn a
line that may help in forecasting the Court's future decisions. The stronger
definition of what makes "impossibility," how far the presumption against
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preemption can reach, and the stronger federal sway of the non obstante
provision that the Court found in the Supremacy Clause, show that the Court
may now be leaning toward a presumption for preemption. The way to reach a
higher point of clarity in the realm of federal preemption that the Court has
chosen-allowing state tort claims of rightful plaintiffs to go unheard based
solely on whether they were prescribed a generic prescription drug or a brandname prescription drug-does not seem to sit well with the dissent in PLIVA or
with overall good conscience. Because a change in majority justices can easily
occur with the current composition of the Court, it may be questioned how
concrete the Court's precedent actually is.
Further, it remains unseen what the lower federal courts may do with
the PLIVA versus Wyeth paradigm. There seems to be some loopholes that may
already be coming undone in the lower courts, and the Supreme Court may find
itself facing another federal preemption case involving a generic drug
manufacturer, or both a generic drug manufacturer and brand-name
manufacturer. The many elements at play-for instance, the states themselves
that may grapple for more power to protect their own citizens-leave the
question still unanswered as to how this area of federal preemption will play
out in the future.
Although the Court was trying to find a settling point for federal
preemption law, it has opened doors that will likely need closing in the future.
The policy behind the dissent's argument in PLIVA makes the most sense; an
unknowing consumer should be protected no matter what type of manufacturer
made the drug. 230 The Court has left loopholes that are already being exploited
and which may be further exploited not only by the judiciary, but by concerned
state legislatures who want to provide avenues for injured citizens (i.e. through
the attorney general scenario). As a consequence, the Court will have to deal
with this issue again, even though it appears that is exactly what it was trying to
avoid.
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